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I. INTRODUCTION
Business in the high-technology field moves at the speed of light. A
highly competitive innovation rapidly loses its edge within a matter of
months of its debut.' The people who develop software, crucial market-
ing schemes, and who otherwise deal with sensitive, valuable informa-
tion are often highly skilled employees commanding top dollar for their
services. 2 The main asset to a high-tech company is the know-how, or
"intellectual capacity" of the company's employees; 3  accordingly,
employers have a significant incentive to keep the know-how within their
domain of property ownership.4
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1. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High-technology Industrial Districts: Silicon
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 603 (1999) ("Given the
speed of innovation and the corresponding telescoping of product life cycles, knowledge more than a
year or two old likely no longer has significant competitive value.").
2. Kristina L. Carey, Comment, Beyond the Route 128 Paradigm: Emerging Legal Alternatives
to the Non-Compete Agreement and Their Potential Effect on Developing High- Technology Markets,
5 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 135, 136 (2001) (introducing the idea that the primary asset of a
high-tech company is the "intellectual capital housed in the minds of its workforce").
3. Id.
4. See Ann C. Hodges & Porcher L. Taylor, Ill, The Business Fallout From the Rapid Obsoles-
cence and Planned Obsolescence of High-Tech Products: Downsizing of Noncompetition Agree-
ments, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2005), available at http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?
volume=6&article=3 (noting that employers have the economic incentive to retain the employees
that have the skills and knowledge that the employer needs).
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There are two well-defined areas of law that have been used by em-
ployers to protect this valuable know-how: contract law and trade secret
law. An additional method of protection, however, has been developed-
the inevitable disclosure doctrine. This Comment discusses these three
methods, and argues that the modem application of the third method
should be abandoned by the State of Washington before it gains
prominence in this jurisdiction.
The first method used to restrict employee mobility, the noncom-
petition agreement, has its roots in contract law. 5 A noncompetition
agreement is a contract in which an employee promises that, after the
termination of employment, he will refrain from competing with his for-
mer employer's business for a specific amount of time and in a specific
geographical region. 6 Noncompetition agreements protect employers by
preventing proprietary information from leaking into the hands of a
competitor.
Distinct from the contractual solution is the second legal tool that
protects employer-owned information from being stolen-the law of
trade secrets. Trade secrets are inherently difficult to define,7 but can be
generally regarded as secret business information that has value based on
the fact that it is not widely known. 8 Trade secrets can come in the form
of a customer list, a process for manufacturing, or even a particular mar-
keting scheme. 9 All that is required is that the information be valuable
while simultaneously being stored as a secret.10 The owner of the
valuable, secret information must regard the information as valuable by
keeping it a secret from competitors, and by leading other employees to
believe that the information is to be kept under wraps." Regardless of the
existence of a noncompetition agreement, current and past employees are
5. Id. ("To retain valued employees in this age of change, employers frequently resort to cove-
nants not to compete, restricting workers from departing to work for competitors ... .
6. Gilson, supra note 1, at 602-03.
7. William G. Porter I1 & Michael C. Griffaton, Identifying and Protecting Employers' Inter-
ests in Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information, 68 DEF. COUNs. J. 439, 440 (2001) (noting com-
ment b to the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 757 that "An exact definition of a trade secret is
not possible.").
8. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 528 (2003).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 757.
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advan-
tage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical
compound, a process for manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern or ma-
chine for other devise, or a list of customers.
10. Jules S. Brenner, The Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure and its Inevitable Effect on Com-
panies and People, 7 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 647,651 (2001).
11. Id. at 651.
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under a duty to refrain from disclosing the trade secrets that their
employer owns. 12
Aside from the existence of a noncompetition agreement and trade
secret misappropriation litigation, another way to retain the legal owner-
ship of secret information is through the doctrine of inevitable disclo-
sure. 13 This doctrine allows a former employer to prevent a former em-
ployee from working for a new employer in a position where the former
employee would inevitably disclose the former employer's trade
secrets.' 4 The employer does not have to show that proprietary informa-
tion was actually disclosed in order to obtain relief, but merely has to
show that there is a very real possibility that such a disclosure would
occur.' 5 This doctrine succeeds in containing proprietary information
within the employer's domain of ownership because both employees and
new employers do not want to run the risk of costly litigation by the
former employer.' 6 Thus, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure operates as
a de facto noncompetition agreement and limits employee mobility from
one high-tech job to the next.
This Comment reviews Washington's trade secret law as well as its
stance on noncompetition agreements and argues that Washington should
abandon its prior recognition of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. The
reasonableness standard used to judge the legality of noncompetition
agreements should be applied with proper regard to the fast-paced nature
of technological innovation. Technology-based industries have continued
to lead the economy in Washington, and such industries "now account
for the largest share of employment, business activity, and labor income
of any major sector in the state's economic base."' 7 As compared to the
rest of the country, Washington is "a center of technology-based em-
ployment and [research and development] activity,"' 18 and such industries
12. Carey, supra note 2, at 138.
13. See id. at 140 (Trade secrets law "allows an employer to protect its proprietary information
from competitors, and can be used to lessen the damage caused by employee defection."); id. at 141
("The non-compete covenant is another weapon in the arsenal of the employer who wishes to protect
a legitimate business interest."); id. at 147 ("The [inevitable disclosure] doctrine essentially bridges
the gap between trade secrets law and covenants not-to-compete .... The doctrine allows an em-
ployer to prevent or restrict a former employee from assuming tasks in a new setting where they will
inevitably disclose trade secrets of the prior employer.").
14. Id. at 147.
15. Id. at 148.
16. See James Pooley, Update on Trade Secret Law, 764 PRAC. LAW INST. 173, 187 (2003)
("Covenants restricting an employee's right to compete following termination are one way to avoid
the cost and unpredictability of trade secret litigation.").
17. William B. Beyers, The Economic Impact of Technology-based Industries in Washington
State, at i. (Feb. 2005), http://www.technology-alliance.com/documents/economicimpact 2005.pdf.
18. Id. at 30.
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are a growing sector in the Washington economy.' 9 The importance of
such industries to the Washington economy makes it crucial that Wash-
ington courts continue to uphold reasonable noncompetition agreements.
However, to allow for the continued growth and expansion of technol-
ogy-based industries, the inevitable disclosure doctrine should not gain
precedential value. Washington's recognition and enforcement of rea-
sonable noncompetition agreements provides employers with sufficient
protection of their legitimate business interests, and therefore the doc-
trine of inevitable disclosure is an overbroad restriction on employee
mobility. The ability for high-tech employees to rapidly change jobs has
been recognized as a key component to the creation of a successful, ex-
pansive technology-based economic community.2° Overly restrictive
noncompetition agreements and the inevitable disclosure doctrine
together risk chilling high-tech growth by quelling employee mobility.
21
Part II of this Comment discusses the history and need for trade
secret law, while providing an overview of Washington's current appli-
cation of trade secret law. This Part also notes the risks associated with
enforcing a valid trade secret misappropriation claim. Part III addresses
the history and importance of noncompetition agreements, as well as
their inherent conflict with the notion of employee mobility.
Washington's recognition of reasonable noncompetition agreements is
also discussed. Part IV discusses the modem application of the doctrine
of inevitable disclosure, as well as the benefits and costs of recognizing
the doctrine in Washington. Finally, Part V argues that Washington
should abandon its recognition of the inevitable disclosure doctrine and
maintain its reliance on the enforcement of reasonable noncompetition
agreements.
II. TRADE SECRET LAW
The law of trade secret protects valuable secret business informa-
tion from misappropriation by others.2 2 A misappropriation of a trade
secret requires a showing that (1) the information is a "trade secret" and
that (2) the appropriator disclosed, acquired, or used the secret
19. Id. at 32.
20. Carey, supra note 2, at 137. See also Gilson, supra note 1, at 603 (noting that the speed of
innovation in the high-tech field combined with product life cycles makes any knowledge about such
technology less valuable after one to two years).
21. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 624 (discussion on noncompetition agreements). See also id.
(discussion regarding the inevitable disclosure doctrine).
22. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 528.
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information in a way that is recognized as legally wrongful.23 Misappro-
priation occurs when improper means are used to acquire the secret
knowledge.24
Trade secrets are one of the most valuable assets that a company
can own. In regard to the high-technology field, the majority of the
valuable, secret information classified as a trade secret is "'tacit' knowl-
edge and know-how." 26 An employee's knowledge of how a specific
firm's technology works or how the marketing is effective comes from
the hands-on experience that the employee obtains while performing his
daily duties on the job. An employee's worth to a firm is derived, in part,
from the possession of such information.27 When an employee changes
jobs, the information that he used at his prior job is transferred to the
employee's new employer, for better or for worse. It is this "knowledge
spillover" 28 that contributed to the success of the high-tech industry in
Silicon Valley. 29 Naturally, the employer who has spent effort and
money on recruiting, educating, and cultivating the employee seeks to
protect the tacit knowledge from leaking into the competitor's domain.30
A. The Formulation of Trade Secret Law in the United States
American trade secret law owes its heritage to the English common
law.31 In the early 1800s, the English Courts of Equity first considered
the misappropriation of secret subject matter.32 The U.S. courts turned to
these English decisions when confronted with complex commercial
23. Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167, 196 (2005) (listing the definition for
misappropriation as given in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)).
24. Id. The definition of "improper means" under the UTSA includes "theft, bribery, misrepre-
sentation, breach or inducement of breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through elec-
tronic or other means." Id.
25. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86
CAL. L. REV. 241, 243 (1998).
26. Gilson, supra note 1, at 595.
27. Id. (noting that the trade secret aspect of a firm's intellectual property portfolio is "embed-
ded in the employee's human capital.").
28. Id. A firm's intellectual property often comprises informal information about research and
development, hands-on experience, etc., which is housed in the human capital of the firm's employ-
ees. Thus, when an employee leaves one firm for another, this trade secret information spills over to
the new firm.
29. Id. ("Because California does not enforce post-employment covenants not to compete, high
technology firms in Silicon Valley gain from knowledge spillovers between firms.").
30. Id. Individual employers have an interest in protecting their intellectual capital in the form
of trade secrets by preventing knowledge spillover.
31. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 529.
32. Id. Schechter and Thomas refer the reader to I MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRET LAW §
2.01 (1998) for a discussion of the English development of trade secrets.
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disputes that arose out of the Industrial Age.33 The 1868 Peabody v.
Norfolk34 decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is con-
sidered the first legal opinion to firmly establish the law of trade secrets
in the United States.35 Since then, state law has continued to amor-
phously define trade secret law.36 To that end, three model acts have
been codified in order to create a definitive definition of "trade secret"
and promote uniformity amongst the states.37
The first codified model act dealing with trade secret protection is
the Restatement of Torts, first published in 1939.38 The Restatement de-
fined the subject matter that constituted trade secret, as well as outlined
the elements for a cause of action based on the misappropriation of a
trade secret. 39 Section 757 defined trade secret as "any formula, pattern,
device or compilation of information which is used in one's business and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it.'4°
The second model act dealing with trade secret protection is the
Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA), which was published in 1979 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law.41 The
declarations in the UTSA regarding trade secrets were based on both the
first Restatement of Torts and intervening case law.42 The UTSA defines
trade secret as follows:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the cir-
cumstances to maintain its secrecy.43
33. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 529.
34. 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
35. Bone, supra note 25, at 252.
36. Id. at 248 ("Since its emergence in the middle of the nineteenth century, trade secret law
has developed primarily as a creature of state common law.").
37. Brenner, supra note 10, at 652. The three model codes are as follows: the RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939), the UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (1979), and the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995).
38. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 529.
39. RAPHAEL V. LUPO & DONNA M. TANGUAY, WHAT CORPORATE AND GENERAL
PRACTITIONERS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT IP LITIGATION 78 (1991).
40. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); see also Brenner, supra note 10, at
652.
41. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 530.
42. Carey, supra note 2, at 139.
43. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1979).
478 [Vol. 30:473
Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure in Washington
Lastly, trade secret has also been defined by the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition." Here, a trade secret is "any information
that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise that is
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic
advantage over others. 45
Trade secrets are recognized in all jurisdictions of the United
States46 and are traditionally the subject of state law.47 A majority of
states, including Washington,48 have adopted the UTSA, in whole or in
part, while six states have yet to do So.49 While there is large-scale adop-
tion of the UTSA, both the definition of what information constitutes a
trade secret as well as the procedural aspects of trade secret litigation
make trade secret law less protective than one might initially perceive.5 °
B. The Protection Afforded by Trade Secret Law
In order for information to qualify as a "trade secret" under the
UTSA definition, it must be unknown to the relevant industry, the owner
must receive some type of economic advantage by virtue of the informa-
tion being a secret, and the owner must reasonably attempt to keep the
information a secret.51 The employer who wants to prevail on a claim for
trade secret misappropriation will need to prove that the information is
actually a protectable trade secret and that it was improperly acquired by
the defendant. 52
The first element of trade secret misappropriation is that the infor-
mation must be classified as a trade secret.53 At first glance it may seem
like this would be an easy element to prove, especially because so many
44. Brenner, supra note 10, at 654.
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
46. William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating To Employee Mobility in
High-Technology Industries, 17 LAB. LAW. 25, 51 (2001).
47. Brenner, supra note 10, at 652. ("Trade secret law is an amalgam of state law developed
and adopted from uniform federal acts."). However, the federal government engaged in trade secret
lawmaking when it passed the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39.
This Act will not be addressed in this Comment, as it is outside the scope of the pertinent issue at
hand. For further discussion, see James H.A. Pooley, Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of
1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177 (1997).
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108.010 (2006). The definition given for trade secret is identical to
that promulgated in the UTSA and was adopted by Washington without change.
49. Rowe, supra note 23, at 193-94 (forty-four states, including Washington D.C., have
adopted UTSA, but Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming
have not).
50. Gilson, supra note 1, at 597-600.
51. Schaller, supra note 46, at 51.
52. Gilson, supra note 1, at 598.
53. See Rowe, supra note 23, at 196. The definition for misappropriation as given in the UTSA
is listed
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states have adopted the UTSA. However, the UTSA definition does not
resolve the inherent difficulty in defining protectable subject matter.5 4
The second element of trade secret misappropriation is the exis-
tence of improper means to acquire the information. 55 As with the first
element, the definitional problem associated with trade secret law affects
the ease of proving the second element; it is difficult to prove that illicit
means were used to procure the trade secret if it is unclear as to what
information constitutes a protectable trade secret in the first place. The
blurred line between what types of information can actually be classified
as a trade secret coupled with the risks inherent in the litigation makes
trade secret misappropriation litigation undesirable. 56
1. The Definitional Problem: What Type of
Information Is Protected as a Trade Secret?
(a) Protectable Subject Matter
The distinguishing line between what constitutes the employee's
own general knowledge and what constitutes the employer's trade secret
remains ambiguous.57 Absent a bright-line definition,58 multiple types of
information can be classified as a trade secret, as long as the information
is kept sufficiently quiet. 59 There are, however, three basic requirements
for information to qualify as a trade secret: (1) the information must be a
secret in fact; 60 (2) the information must be valuable as a result of not
being known or readily ascertainable by others;6' and (3) the owner of
the information must have made reasonable efforts to keep the
information a secret.62
The first requirement of actual secrecy eliminates protection for in-
formation that can be ascertained by reverse engineering or through rela-
tively easy independent discovery.63 However, a party seeking to prove
actual secrecy does not have a high burden to meet this requirement.
54. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 599 ("The substantive problem relates to the imprecision of the
lines that the UT[S]A requires a litigant to establish.").
55. See Rowe, supra note 23, at 196. The definition of "improper means" under the UTSA
includes "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of breach of a duty to maintain
secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means." Id.
56. Gilson, supra note 1, at 599-600.
57. Id. at 599.
58. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 531.
59. Rowe, supra note 23, at 194. For example, information such as customer lists, pricing
policies, supplier lists, and chemical formulas qualify as "trade secrets."
60. Bone, supra note 25, at 248.
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. e (1995).
62. See Bone, supra note 25, at 248.
63. Id. at 249.
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Absolute secrecy is not demanded; the proprietor of the secret can share
the secret information with other employees on a need-to-know basis in
order to realize the commercial benefit of the secret knowledge.64
The second factor, the requirement that the information be of value,
is not normally at issue in trade secret litigation. An owner would not
typically be willing to pay the high costs of litigation and run the risk of
divulging confidential information if the secret was not of value.65 Fur-
ther, this requirement is very general and can be satisfied by anything
that has a potential to generate commercial value. 66 However, regardless
of the information's value, a firm that has been the target of trade secret
misappropriation in the past may be willing to sue for misappropriation
simply to harass the defendant-competitor. 67 Similarly, a firm may
engage in litigation to harass a defected employee from engaging in his
own start-up company, merely to quash potential competition in the
future.68
The last factor used to decide whether the information qualifies as a
trade secret is whether the owner took reasonable steps to maintain
secrecy.69 Reasonable attempts to keep the information a secret can
include, for example, securing the information as sensitive data or pro-
viding a secure access system to such information via locks or guards.7v
Defining what types of information constitute a trade secret is a
tricky task.7 1 It is difficult, if not impossible, for an employer to accu-
rately gauge whether it has a successful misappropriation claim simply
because the employer does not have an adequate way to detect the theft
of a trade secret.72 Similarly, the employee may not know what
64. Id. at 248-49.
65. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 533 ("The high cost of enforcing intellectual
property rights suggests that plaintiffs will only commence litigation concerning information of
considerable value.").
66. Bone, supra note 25, at 248 (referring to commercial value requirement as competitive
advantage, but the terms are used interchangeably).
67. See id. at 279 ("Indeed, the circumstances of trade secret cases and the uncertainty of trade
secret law create incentives for frivolous litigation designed to harass competitors rather than obtain
relief for trade secret misappropriation.").
68. Id.
69. See id. at 248.
70. See generally ROBERT C. DORR & CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE
SECRETS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS § 2.05 (3d. ed. Supp. 2003) (noting the various
procedures that an employer may take to protect secret information from disclosure).
71. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 599 (defining what are employer-owned trade secrets and what
is employee-owned knowledge is a "judgment call for the trier of fact."); see also Katherine V.W.
Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Work-
place, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 756 ("[A] trade secret is not a self-defining term. Different courts, at
different times, have used different definitions of what constitutes a trade secret.").
72. Bone, supra note 25, at 278. The intangible nature of trade secrets makes the traditional
signs of property theft inapplicable in a misappropriation suit. Further, reverse engineering and inde-
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information he can divulge or use while employed in his new position.
This potentially increases the risk that the employee will be liable for the
misappropriation of a trade secret.73
(b) Improper Use, Disclosure, or Acquisition
The definitional problem with trade secret also implicates the sec-
ond element of a misappropriation claim because it makes more difficult
the task of proving that a defendant used illicit means to obtain the secret
information. If a supposed owner cannot precisely define what he has
lost, he will have a difficult time showing that the asset was illegally
obtained by the defendant.
The misappropriation of trade secrets generally occurs in two dif-
ferent ways. First, a person who has no relationship to the owner of the
secret may acquire the secret information though improper acquisition, or
illegal acts.74 This type of misappropriation covers situations where a
defendant acquires the information via theft, fraud, or bribery.75 Second,
a misappropriation can occur when there is breach of a confidential rela-
tionship where the duty to protect the trade secret is either explicitly
made in a contract or implied through the parties' relationship.76 This
Comment focuses on the second type of misappropriation.
2. The Procedural Problem with Trade Secret Law
As discussed, trade secret litigation can be a lengthy, expensive
process due to the imprecise nature of the requisite elements.77 Further,
the inherent nature of a misappropriation claim renders it unlikely to be
resolved via summary judgment; rather, a strong possibility exists that
any resolution would require a full trial. 78 This procedural aspect leads to
increased uncertainty regarding the outcome of a misappropriation
pendent discovery are two means by which a competitor can come across the secret in a manner that
is not unlawful.
73. See Carey, supra note 2, at 141. Carey discusses how the information that a former em-
ployee takes with him to a new firm is seen as an important ingredient for creating start-up compa-
nies. Id. If what is considered "proprietary information" is defined broadly, then employees will be
discouraged from leaving their current positions out of fear that they will be embroiled in litigation
with their former employer. Id.
74. This type of misappropriation will not be covered in this Comment, as this type demands
that the wrongful appropriator violate an express agreement not to compete, in which the contract
was entered into for the purpose of keeping a trade secret under wraps from a competitor.
75. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1979).
76. Id. § l(2)(ii).
77. Gilson, supra note 1, at 599.
78. See id. at 599-600.
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claim. 79 Also, there is a risk that bringing a trade secret misappropriation
claim will potentially erase the secret status of the information as the en-
forceability of the claim may require full disclosure of the information
during the discovery process. 80
However, there are two procedural rules that offer limited protec-
tion of trade secrets during litigation. Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c)(7), the court may exempt trade secrets from discovery
during the litigation process. 81 Additionally, under Rule 45, federal
courts may modify or quash subpoenas that require the disclosure of
trade secrets.82 While these rules do provide some protection to the trade
secret holder, courts seemingly favor open disclosure of trade secrets
during the litigation process.83
3. The Usefulness of Trade Secret Law
While a misappropriation claim may be difficult to use successfully
against ex-employees and their new firms, 84 trade secret law is still valu-
able to the intellectual property scheme in the United States. Trade secret
law provides protection for valuable information that cannot be protected
85by other means. As such, the protection afforded to secret information
affects employers and employees in the high-technology field.86 Trade
secret law protects certain subject matter from falling into the public do-
main, giving inventors legal means to protect their technology. 87 An
79. Id. at 600. Gilson makes the inference that there is uncertainty with regard to the outcome
of a case when technical issues are tried by a jury. See id.
80. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 532.
81. Id. (Courts can require that "a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way.") (quoting FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(c)(7)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 597-601. The substantive and procedural problems inherent in
trade secret misappropriation litigation make it expensive and uncertain.
85. See Bone, supra note 25, at 248. Bone claims that trade secret law is not a necessary source
of protection for information because he believes that, subject to a few limited exceptions, contract
law is a more viable means of affording greater, more efficient protection to the proprietors of trade
secrets. Id. This author does not refute Bone's thesis, but rather discusses the interplay between trade
secret law and that of the specific contract law governing noncompetition agreements. Bone does
say, however, that "trade secret law protects unpatentable as well as patentable information." Id.
86. See Carey, supra note 2, at 140-41.
Traditional trade secrets law has obvious implications within a competitive technology-
based market .... Broad interpretation of information as proprietary might both discour-
age employees from forming new companies out of fear that they will find themselves
entangled in litigation with former employers, and damage the employer's company,
which will no longer be able to freely profit from the knowledge and experience of new
hires.
Id.
87. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 528-29.
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inventor can protect his invention in one of two ways: (I) maintaining
the technology as a trade secret, or (2) applying for and obtaining federal
patent protection. 88 The second option, however, is not always avail-
able. 89 Not all subject matter is patentable; for example, customer lists or
marketing techniques have value to the inventor/proprietor but are not
protected under the patent laws. 90 Further, an inventor may be in the
process of applying for patent protection but may still need the protection
afforded via trade secret law in order to keep the invention within his
domain of ownership.9' Therefore, in many cases, ownership rights over
innovative technology can only be secured under trade secret law; 92
without it, the technology would fall into the public domain 93 and the
inventor would no longer be able to lay claim to the technology's
ownership rights.
Even where patents are an option for protection, trade secret is
often the preferred mode of protection. First, the protection afforded by
trade secret attaches automatically to the secret information; in contrast,
a patent only protects valuable information after an application is filed
with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and after a patent is
issued.94 Additionally, trade secret protection continues until the owner
fails to keep the information secret, which can be in perpetuity, while
patent protection only exists for a twenty year period.9 5
As discussed, the difficulties and uncertainties of successful trade
secret misappropriation litigation prompt employers to seek protection
for their trade secrets in the realm of contract law as opposed to intellec-
tual property law. 96 Contract principles are well established and well un-
derstood by employers, courts, and (arguably) employees. The next
88. Id. ("Trade secrecy serves as the chief alternative to the patent system. An inventor must
either maintain a technology as a trade secret, seek patent information from the PTO [Patent and
Trademark Office], or allow the technology to enter the public domain.").
89. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 529.
90. Id.
91. See Bone, supra note 25, at 271 (noting that firms can use patent law to protect finalized
research projects, but can use trade secret law to protect the intermediate results of those projects).
See generally SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 529. Trade secret law is one of the two ways
for an owner of a technology to establish secure property rights in the technology. Id. The patent
system is the other method, and it follows that an invention that is in the process of obtaining patent
protection will remain protected by trade secret while the patent application process endures. Id.
92. Bone, supra note 25, at 271.
93. Id.
94. Roger Braunfeld & Thomas 0. Wells, Protecting Your Most Valuable Asset: Intellectual
Property, IT PROF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 14-15.
95. Id. at 15. See also SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 8, at 528 ("Trade secret status is not
limited to a fixed number of years, but endures so long as the information is valuable and maintained
as a secret.").
96. Pooley, supra note 16, at 187. ("Covenants restricting an employee's right to compete
following termination are one way to avoid the cost and unpredictability of trade secret litigation.").
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Part discusses the application of noncompetition agreements toward the
goal of trade secret protection.
III. NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS: OVERVIEW
AND APPLICATION IN WASHINGTON STATE
A. The History of Noncompetition Agreements
During the Middle Ages, English common law prohibited
noncompetition agreements because they were viewed as restraints on
trade. 97 However, once capitalism began to guide England's public poli-
cies, limited restraints on trade were recognized by the English courts.98
The "rule of reason" test used to judge the validity of modern day non-
competition agreements comes from the English case Mitchel v.
Reynolds.99 In that case, the court recognized situations where legitimate
business purposes compel an employer to execute a noncompetition
agreement with an employee.' 00 The Mitchel court thus recognized that a
legitimate business purpose coupled with the existence of adequate con-
sideration given in return for the promise not to compete in the future
could justify a restrictive noncompetition agreement.101
Later, the English court factored public interest into the reasonable-
ness analysis. In Homer v. Graves,0 2 the court held that the
reasonableness of the restraint was also guided by any potential impact
that the agreement may have on the relevant public welfare.' 0 3
Noncompetition agreements that unreasonably harmed the public welfare
were unenforceable regardless of the existence of a legitimate business
purpose and adequate consideration. 104
These rules were eventually transferred to the United States. The
Supreme Court adopted the "rule of reason" as the test for determining
the enforceability of a noncompetition agreement in the seminal case of
Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor in 1874.105 In that case, the
Court determined the restrictive agreement as enforceable even though
the agreement's geographic scope was unusually broad, encompassing
97. Brian Kingsley Krumm, Covenants Not to Compete: Time for Legislative and Judicial
Reform in Tennessee, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 447, 450 (2005).
98. Id. at 451.
99.24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711) (cited in Krumm, supra note 97, at 451).
100. Krumm, supra note 97 at 451-52. There had to be an essential or economic business
purpose behind the noncompetition agreement in order for it to be reasonable.
101. Id. at 452 (citing to the Mitchel decision).
102. 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831) (cited in Krumm, supra note 97, at 452).
103. Krumm, supra note 97, at 452.
104. Id.
105. 87 U.S. 64 (1874) (cited in Krumm, supra note 97, at 453).
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the entire state of California. 10 6 The decision was based on the legitimate
business interest held by the seller of the steamboat, and thus the restric-
tion was deemed reasonable. The Oregon Steam Navigation decision
nationally established that the rule of reason test governed the
enforceability of noncompetition agreements.10 7
B. Employer Incentives for Noncompetition Agreements
An employer's incentive to retain an employee turns on the em-
ployee's value to the firm. 0 8 In today's economy, human capital has
been viewed as an increasingly important factor in a firm's marketplace
success and its competitive advantage.' 0 9 This is especially true in the
high-technology field because technical know-how and creativity"0 lead
to innovation."' A high-tech firm has a strong interest in obtaining and
retaining its employees because the majority of its intellectual property is
contained in the human capital of the company's employees. 12
Employee mobility is greater now than it has ever been. 1 3 The
large amount of employee turnover witnessed in the high-technology
sector is due in part to the "culture of mobility" ' 1 4 created by a geo-
graphical region's legal infrastructure. When a new employee starts
working at a firm, that employee has the opportunity to educate the more
senior employees, raising the level of innovation and efficiency at the
firm.' 15 This education of senior employees is an added bonus for the
106. Id. This case was decided prior to California's adoption of § 16600, which prohibits re-
strictive employment covenants in California. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (1941).
107. Krumm, supra note 97, at 453.
108. See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of
the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 576-77 (2001)
(discussing how employee knowledge of how his employer-company works is one of the employer's
major assets, which provides the incentive to require employees to sign noncompetition agreements).
109. Hodges & Taylor, supra note 4, at 3.
110. It is the combination of technical knowledge and creativity that is the human capital asset
housed in the mind of the employee.
11l. Hodges & Taylor, supra note 4, at 4.
112. Gilson, supra note 1, at 595.
113. Hodges & Taylor, supra note 4, at 2 ("[E]mployee mobility has increased, particularly in
the information industry.").
114. Hodges & Taylor, supra note 4, at 5 (citing Gilson, supra note 1, at 590, for the proposi-
tion that the legal infrastructure of California that bars noncompetition agreements has led to Silicon
Valley's success because employees were able to freely move from one employer to another and
thus knowledge was able to flow to new firms, benefiting the industry as a whole).
115. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 595. Gilson refers to employee mobility as being the source
by which the new employer gains knowledge of a competitor's intellectual property. Id. It follows
that the knowledge the employee possess (who is probably hired because he possess some knowl-
edge which will result in an economic gain to the new firm) will be useful to the new employer if the
employee shares his knowledge with his coworkers or uses his knowledge while performing his
employment duties.
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new firm: not only did it acquire the new employee for a specific task
which the employee has the skills to complete, but the employee has
made other employees more valuable as well. 16 Such knowledge spill-
over is credited with the economic success of Silicon Valley.' 17 While
this spillover is a boon for the new employer, it can be equally regarded
as a loss for the previous employer, and it is this loss that employers seek
to avoid via the use of noncompetition agreements.1
18
Additionally, the fast-paced nature of the high-technology industry
increases an employer's desire to retain employees for the period in
which the employee's knowledge remains valuable. 1 9 The value of tech-
nological advancements in the high-tech industry is affected by time: the
fact that such advancements are commercially valuable for a short period
of time also makes the knowledge, or trade secret, known by an em-
ployee obsolete after a short period of time.120 This rapid obsolescence of
employee knowledge has an impact on the reasonableness of the time
constraint imposed by a noncompetition agreement, and thus, should be
taken into consideration by Washington courts when evaluating the
reasonableness of noncompetition agreements.
While the rapid obsolescence of a technological advance might ini-
tially seem to make a knowledgeable employee less valuable as time
passes, the employee knows yet other information that confers a com-
petitive advantage to the employer.' 2 1 Employees have valuable knowl-
edge about the employer's business operations, organizational aspects,
markets, competitors, customers, and production methods, to name a few
examples. 122 Further, employees have "negative knowledge"' 23 about the
116. Id. Gilson notes that laws that are favorable to employee mobility allow for employees to
share their prior knowledge with their new co-workers (this is "knowledge spillover"), making the
new firm better off because now all employees benefit from the knowledge the new employee pos-
sesses. Id. A legal infrastructure that allows for a high degree of employee mobility is one factor that
positively influences industry-wide growth in a given geographic area. Id.
117. Id. The employee's change of jobs is the mechanism by which the knowledge has the
opportunity to leak to new coworkers.
118. See generally Stone, supra note 108, at 577.
Increasingly, employers are requiring employees to accept covenants not to compete or
covenants not to disclose confidential information at the outset of an employment rela-
tionship. And increasingly, employers are suing their former employees at the end of an
employment relationship, seeking to enjoin them from taking knowledge acquired on the
job with them to use on behalf of a competitor.
119. Gilson, supra note 1, at 603. Gilson states that noncompetition agreements are effective in
the high-technology industries because the speed of innovation and corresponding life cycles makes
knowledge that is greater than one to two years old basically obsolete of any competitive value. Id.
120. Hodges & Taylor, supra note 4, at 13.
12 1. Stone, supra note 108, at 576.
122. Id.
123. Id. Negative knowledge is, for example, the processes, methods, and technologies that do
not work and therefore do not directly confer a competitive advantage on the employer.
20071
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types of things that have been tried but that ultimately failed; this knowl-
edge saves the employer money and time from attempting to duplicate
unsuccessful endeavors. 12
4
Knowledge spills over into the relevant commercial area when em-
ployees are free to switch between employers. 125 However, the rate and
substantiality of the spillover is sharply curtailed when noncompetition
clauses are introduced into the employment contract. 126 Because the
knowledge spillover is what helps to account for a geographic area's
innovative success, the existence of noncompetition agreements can
drastically reduce the amount of technological innovation that a particu-
lar area otherwise aims to generate. 27 With this in mind, a state that is
home to high-tech firms and recognizes reasonable noncompetition
agreements should carefully consider the impact of such recognition on
the future growth of the state's high-tech industry.
C. Washington's Recognition of Noncompetition Agreements
Washington recognizes reasonably written noncompetition agree-
ments. 128 Because a noncompetition agreement is essentially a contract
where an employee promises not to compete with his employer in the
future, consideration 29 must be given for the contract to be upheld. 130
Notably, all of the standard contract defenses, such as estoppel, fraud,
duress, and lack of consideration are available to challenge the validity of
the promise not to compete.' The three main benefits of a
noncompetition agreement are: (1) it provides the employer with the im-
mediate ability to seek judicial relief because an employee's simple act
of joining a competitor is specifically in violation of the agreement;' 32 (2)
it represents a bargained-for agreement of an employment restriction, and
as such, courts are more likely and more willing to issue injunctive relief
124. Id.
125. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 603.
126. Id.
127. Id. The existence of noncompetition agreements impacts the potential for a district to host
the type of economy that is present in Silicon Valley. Noncompetition agreements halt employee
mobility, which then prevents the significant amount of knowledge spillover that is needed for a
district to obtain a districtwide innovation cycle.
128. Knight, Vale & Gregory v. McDaniel, 37 Wash. App. 366, 369, 690 P.2d 448, 451-52
(1984).
129. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, THE 2003 EMPLOYMENT LAW HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL
GuIDE FOR WASHINGTON EMPLOYERS 96 (2003) ("'Consideration' is a bargained-for exchange of
promises or things .... ").
130. Id. ("[C]onsideration is usually the most important issue in determining contract valid-
ity.").
131. Schaller, supra note 46, at 38.
132. Id at 42.
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on behalf of the former employer; 33 and (3) it serves as a deterrent for
other employers when they consider hiring a person who is bound by
such an agreement. 1
34
An effective noncompetition agreement discourages an employee
from leaving her current job given the fear of liability. 135 Tangentially, a
competitor-firm may also shy away from hiring an employee who is
party to such an agreement in order to avoid litigation in the future. 36 As
a consequence, the knowledge spillover in the relevant high-tech industry
is lessened and the innovation within the relevant industry becomes
internalized. 37 The district-wide innovation that is present in places like
Silicon Valley is no longer a reality, as employees remain in current
positions and competitors seek employees from other sources. 38
1. Requirement of Adequate Consideration
A contract must be valid in order to be enforceable.139 In other
words, consideration must be given to the employee in exchange for the
employee's promise not to compete within a certain geographic area for
a certain period of time. 140 In Washington, the general rule for considera-
tion in the noncompetition agreement context is that consideration exists
if the employee enters into the contract at the time when he is hired.' 4'
However, the courts also recognize the existence of adequate considera-
tion when additional benefits are given to an employee after that em-
ployee has already begun to work for the employer. 42 Recently, the
Washington Supreme Court held that continued employment is not valid
consideration for a noncompetition agreement. 43 Therefore, an em-
ployee's promise not to compete must be given in return for something
133. Id. at 42-43.
134. Id. at 43.
135. Gilson, supra note 1, at 606.
136. See Rowe, supra note 23, at 210. When there is a noncompetition agreement in place and
an employee has been hired by the former-employer's fierce competitor, then "the balance tips to-
ward the issuance of an injunction." The inference is that former employers have incentive to litigate
against the new employer for taking their old employee.
137. Gilson, supra note 1, at 603.
138. See generally id. at 602-03 (discussing the effect that noncompetition agreements have on
employee mobility and thus innovation in a district).
139. DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 129, at 96.
140. Id.
141. Labriola v. Pollard Group, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d 828, 834, 100 P.3d 791, 794 (2004) (recog-
nizing Racine v. Bender, 141 Wash. 606, 615, 252 P. 115, 118 (1927)).
142. See Wood v. May, 73 Wash. 2d 307, 310-11,438 P.2d 587, 589-90 (1968) (holding that
the consideration was adequate because the promise not to compete was given in return for the em-
ployer's promise to teach the employee specific skills).
143. Labriola, 152 Wash. 2d at 830, 100 P.3d at 792.
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other than continued employment, such as a pay raise, additional
training, or increased benefits. 144
2. Requirement of Reasonableness
Once the court has established the validity of the contract between
the former employer and employee, the inquiry focuses on the
reasonableness of the noncompetition agreement itself.145 Washington
courts will enforce noncompetition agreements when the agreement is
reasonable. 46 This is a case-by-case factual analysis wherein the court
determines what type of employer-protection is needed under all of the
facts and circumstances. 47 The reasonableness of such agreement turns
on three factors. The first factor is whether the employer needs the re-
straint to protect its business or goodwill. 48 The second factor focuses on
the scope of the restraint, which calls for a determination of whether the
agreement restrains the employee too much in light of the reasonable
necessity of protecting the employer's interests. 4 9 The third factor looks
into the degree of public injury that the restraint will create when the
employee is no longer allowed to provide his services and skill in another
job. 50 The determination of whether the noncompetition agreement is
reasonable requires balancing the employer's protectable business
interest, the effect the agreement will have on the employee's ability to
earn a living, and the public policy covering competition.' 5'
Moreover, to determine the reasonableness of the noncompetition
agreement, courts will take into account the scope of the restraint with
regard to the duration and geographical limitations that are placed on the
employee. 52 In making this determination, the courts look into the type
of business that the employer is engaged in, as well as the activities that
the agreement prohibits the employee from participating in when com-
pared to the activities that the employee provided for the former
employer. 53
144. DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 129, at 79.
145. Knight, Vale & Gregory v. McDaniel, 37 Wash. App. 366, 369, 690 P.2d 448, 451-52
(1984) (restrictive covenants are enforceable as long as they are "reasonable").
146. David K. DeWolf, Keller W. Allen, & Darlene S. Barrier, Covenants not to Compete, in
25 WASH. PRAC., CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE § 15.5 (2006).
147. DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 129, at 98.
148. Knight, Vale & Gregory, 37 Wash. App. at 369, 690 P.2d at 452.
149. Id.
150. DeWolfet al., supra note 146, at § 15.5.
151. JERRY COHEN & ALAN S. GUTrERMAN, TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION AND
EXPLOITATION 170 (1998).
152. DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 129, at 98.
153. Cohen, supra note 151, at 170.
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The reasonableness of the geographical scope contained in the non-
competition agreement depends on the type of business that the employer
is involved in, as well as the trends of the marketplace.1 54 In contrast to
several other jurisdictions, Washington has not yet determined the
enforceability of a global noncompetition agreement.' 55
The reasonableness of the time constraint imposed on the employee
is judged on a timeframe that would be necessary to protect the
employer's legitimate business interest.156 The actual items that need to
be protected from divulgence by the employee will guide this factual in-
quiry. 57 With regard to the high-tech field, the rapid obsolescence of
information should be a key component in determining the reasonable-
ness of the time constraint. In fact, in EarthWeb Inc. v. Schlack,'58 the
court held that the twelve month time constraint imposed on the ex-
employee was unreasonable in the dynamic internet industry and, as
such, the noncompetition agreement was deemed unreasonable. 59
Washington's enforcement of reasonable noncompetition agree-
ments does not mean that the courts do not value the freedom of em-
ployment. Rather, the reasonable enforcement of such agreements recog-
nizes the inherently competing, but equal, concerns of protecting the
rights of the employer and the freedom of employment and mobility. 60
Under the reasonableness standard, the Washington courts are able to
enforce valid, properly scoped noncompetition agreements' 6' which bet-
ter reflect the position that the parties bargained for.' 62
3. Availability of Judicial Modification: The Blue Pencil Test
Washington is a "blue pencil" jurisdiction, which means that the
court will enforce a noncompetition agreement to the extent that it is
154. RAMSEY M. AL-SALAM, LAWRENCE R. COCK & TRACY L. LEMKE, NAT'L BUS. INST.,
TRADE SECRECY AND NON-COMPETITION COVENANTS IN WASHINGTON: EFFECTIVE DRAFTING AND
ENFORCEMENT 13 (2004).
155. See, e.g., McRand, Inc. v. Van Beelen, 486 N.E.2d 1306, 1315 (I11. App. Ct. 1985), cert.
denied, 490 N.E.2d 1302 (I1. 1986) (nationwide or unlimited territorial prohibitions may be legiti-
mate "if their purpose is to protect an employer from losing clients to a former employee who gains
special knowledge of the client's needs while employed.").
156. See DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 129, at 98-99.
157. Id. at 98.
158. 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
159. Id. at 313.
160. DeWolf et al, supra note 146. ("Public policy requires a court to carefully examine cove-
nants not to compete, even when protection of a legitimate business interest is demonstrated, because
of equally competing concerns of freedom of employment and free access of the public to profes-
sional services.").
161. Id. ("Washington courts will enforce covenants of non-competition if the covenant is
reasonable.").
162. Carey, supra note 2, at 151.
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reasonable. 163 This standard allows courts to strike unreasonable
language from an overly broad noncompetition agreement so that it is
narrow enough to pass the scrutiny of geographical and timeframe rea-
sonableness. 164 Under the blue pencil test, a court can modify the agree-
ment to save an overly broad and restrictive noncompetition agreement
from complete unenforceability. 165 However, a court need not save an
overly broad noncompetition agreement as the blue pencil modification
is purely discretionary. 166 Usual modifications include a narrowing of the
geographic scope 16 1 or a limiting of the timeframe of the agreement's
enforceability. 168
4. Relief Available
An employer with a contractually valid, judicially reasonable non-
competition agreement can seek a variety of remedies to obtain relief for
a breaching ex-employee. First and foremost, the employer can immedi-
ately apply for a temporary restraining order (TRO). A TRO will be
granted where the enforcement of the agreement is crucial and where a
failure to immediately restrain the ex-employee from competing will
result in irreparable harm. 169 Second, an employer may also file for pre-
liminary and permanent injunctions in order to prevent the employee
from engaging in the type of competition that was spelled out in the
agreement. 70 Finally, the employer can seek damages from the breach of
contract by filing a complaint, while also asserting a variety of other
claims, such as trade secret misappropriation and breach of fiduciary
duty.17 1
163. Perry v. Moran, 109 Wash. 2d 691, 703, 748 P.2d 224, 230 (1987).
164. DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 129, at 100.
165. Washington first recognized the blue pencil test in Wood v. May, 73 Wash. 2d 307, 313,
438 P.2d 587, 591 (1968), when the supreme court rejected the line of reasoning that required failure
of the non-compete when the clause was unreasonable with regard to time and area. Instead, the
court chose to follow the case law of other states, where the restraint would be enforceable to the
extent that it was reasonable and lawful. Id.
166. DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 129, at 100.
167. See, e.g., Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Wohlman, 19 Wash. App. 670, 578 P.2d 530
(1978), review denied, 91 Wn.2d 1006 (1978); see also Wood v. May, 73 Wash. 2d 307, 310, 438
P.2d 587, 589 (1968) (noting that modification was permitted).
168. Armstrong v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 30 Wash. App. 538, 543, 635 P.2d 1114, 1118 (1981)
(explaining the rule).
169. DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 129, at 101.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 103.
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IV. THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
Aside from the protection afforded to trade secrets through the
UTSA and the enforcement of noncompetition agreements, Washington
courts may have also recognized the doctrine of inevitable disclosure as
another way to protect intellectual property owned by companies. 72 The
doctrine of inevitable disclosure is a way to obtain relief from the threat-
ened disclosure of a trade secret. 173 The UTSA definition of misappro-
priation allows for the doctrine by permitting employers to protect both
actual and threatened misappropriation. 174 However, adoption of the
UTSA does not guarantee that specific states individually recognize
inevitable disclosure. 175 For example, California has adopted the UTSA
but has explicitly rejected the doctrine. 176 By contrast, New York recog-
nizes the doctrine but it remains one of six states that has not adopted the
UTSA 1 77 Where a noncompetition agreement is signed, the doctrine
172. See Solutec Corp. v. Agnew, No. 16105-6-111, 1997 WL 794496, at *1 (Wash. App. Dec.
30 1997).
173. Rowe, supra note 23, at 181.
174. Id. at 196. The definition of misappropriation under the UTSA is as follows:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know
that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade
secret by another without express or implied consent by a person who: (A) used improper
means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) at the time of disclosure or use,
knew, or had reason to know, that his knowledge of the trade secret was: (1) derived
from, or through, a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; (11) acquired
under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain it secrecy or limit its use; or, (11)
derived from, or through, a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to main-
tain secrecy or limit its use; or (C) before a material change of his position knew or had
reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by
accident or mistake.
Id
175. Id. at 197. Rowe notes:
Because of the UTSA's prohibition against threatened misappropriation, it would seem
that states that have adopted the UTSA would have more favorable treatment of the inevi-
table disclosure doctrine than those who have not. However... that is not the case. Some
states that have adopted the UTSA, like California, have rejected the inevitable disclosure
theory. On the other hand, New York and New Jersey have not adopted the UTSA, but
they have adopted the doctrine.
Id.
176. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1112-13 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) ("The theory of 'inevitable disclosure' is not the law in California."); but see Carey, supra
note 2, at 148 (citing Electro Optical Industries, Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 684 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999), a California case that has adopted the doctrine) ("Although no California court has yet
adopted it, the inevitable disclosure rule is rooted in common sense and ... [w]e adopted the rule
here.").
177. See, e.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Marietta
Corp. v. Fairhurst, No. 37265, slip op. 50351U (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002), rev'd, 754 N.Y.S.2d 62 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2003); see also supra note 49.
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finds support in the public policy of honoring parties' expectations that
valid contracts will be enforced.1
78
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure is a separate method for en-
joining the threatened misappropriation of a trade secret, regardless of
the existence of a noncompetition agreement. 179 The courts use this
doctrine to restrict, and sometimes prevent, former employees from tak-
ing jobs with a new employer where the employee will inevitably dis-
close the confidential trade secrets of the former employer.180 As such,
the concept has grown out of the evolution of trade secret law. 18' To
obtain relief under this doctrine, the plaintiff need not prove that
misappropriation has already occurred; rather, the plaintiff only must
prove that there is a "genuine threat of disclosure. 1
82
For the plaintiff to obtain an injunction, either temporary or perma-
nent, based on a genuine threat of disclosure, the plaintiff must prove two
elements.1 83 First, the plaintiff must show that the former employee has
specific knowledge 84 of the plaintiffs trade secrets. 1 85 Next, the plaintiff
must show that the employee will inevitably use the specific knowledge
at her new position.1 86 The plaintiff can meet these requirements by
showing that (1) the former and current employer are competitors,1 87
(2) the employee's duties at both the former and current position have
significant similarities such that the performance of duties will require
her to use or disclose the former employer's trade secrets,1 88 and (3) the
current employer has not taken measures to prevent the occurrence of
trade secret misappropriation. 89
178. Rowe, supra note 23, at 206 ("In cases where the employee signed a noncompetition
agreement, the argument that the public has the right to expect that valid agreements will be en-
forced, takes center stage.").
179. Id. at 175.
180. Carey, supra note 2, at 147.
181. Brenner, supra note 10, at 658.
182. Carey, supra note 2, at 148.
183. Rowe, supra note 23, at 214.
184. Id. at 213. Specific knowledge is knowledge about something that can be classified as a
trade secret. General knowledge, on the other hand, cannot be classified as a trade secret; it is
knowledge that belongs to the employee and can be used by the employee in whatever capacity the
employee so chooses. Examples of general knowledge are experiences gained from years of working
in the industry or from education and training.
185. Id. at 214.
186. Id.
187. Carey, supra note 2, at 147-48.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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A. History and Application of the Doctrine
Legal commentators generally credit the Seventh Circuit's holding
in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond'90 with creating the modem expression of
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.' 9 1 Prior to the holding in PepsiCo,
courts applied similar theories but had not used the words "inevitable
disclosure."' 92 In PepsiCo, the district court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion, which prevented the defendant and ex-PepsiCo employee, Red-
mond, from assuming any duties with Quaker Oats relating to beverage
pricing, marketing, and distribution.' 93 Both PepsiCo, as maker of "All
Sport," and Quaker Oats, as the producer of "Gatorade," were competing
in the sports drinks beverage market at the time of this litigation.
194
Redmond had worked for PepsiCo for ten years, and while he had signed
a confidentiality agreement, he had not signed a noncompetition agree-
ment. 95 After Redmond left PepsiCo to accept a position with Quaker
Oats, PepsiCo sued Redmond and Quaker Oats, seeking injunctive
relief. 196
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the injunction' 97 and noted
that "a plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by
demonstrating that [the] defendant's new employment will inevitably
lead him to rely on the plaintiffs trade secrets."' 98 The appellate court
also relied on the factors used by the district court to indicate whether
misappropriation was inevitable. 199 These factors included: (1) the cur-
rent employer's policies concerning the use of the former employer's
trade secrets; (2) the employee's candor in discussing the new employ-
ment opportunity with the former employer; (3) the employee's degree of
knowledge concerning the former employer's trade secrets; (4) the scope
of the employee's current position; and (5) whether there had been any
occurrence of actual trade secret misappropriation. 0
190. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
191. Brenner, supra note 10, at 659.
192. Rowe, supra note 23, at 172 n.9 (citing FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'l Inc., 677 F.2d 500,
500-05 (5th Cir. 1982); Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232, 232-34 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1960); Nat'l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31, 31-33 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1987); see also Brenner, supra note 10, at 659 n.85 (listing various other cases
that involve inevitable disclosure prior to the PepsiCo decision).
193. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1263.
194. Rowe, supra note 23, at 172.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 173.
197. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1272.
198. Id. at 1269.
199. Brenner, supra note 10, at 660.
200. Id.
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Legal scholars have written extensively about the PepsiCo holding
and its implications for employee mobility rights, litigation costs, and
technological advancement.20 1  Washington courts should use these
critiques to evaluate whether to fully adopt the doctrine.
B. Washington's Application of the Doctrine
Washington's UTSA 20 2 allows trade secret owners to seek injunc-
tive relief for actual or threatened trade secret misappropriation.2 3 Some
courts seated within states that have adopted the UTSA have interpreted
the language of the Act as allowing injunctions even in the absence of a
showing that an employee actually disclosed or used a trade secret. It is
this interpretation that allows for the recognition of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine. 0
Citing to Solutec Corp., Inc. v. Agnew,20 5 intellectual property law
commentators, as well as some courts, 206 have noted that Washington
implicitly recognizes the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 20 7 While this un-
published opinion cannot establish precedent, it does imply that some
courts believe that Washington's UTSA permits recognition of the doc-
trine.20 8 In Solutec, Mr. Burke, the owner and CEO of Solutec Corpora-
tion, was a chemical engineer who had developed an edible apple wax
201. See Rowe, supra note 23; Gilson, supra note 1; Stone, supra note 108; Stone, supra note
71, at 757-759.
202. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108.010-940 (2006).
203. Id. § 19.108.020.
204. D. Peter Harvey, "Inevitable " Trade Secret Misappropriation after PepsiCo, Inc. v. Red-
mond, 533 PUB. LAW INST. 123, 127 (1998).
205. No. 16105-6-111, 1997 WL 794496, at *1 (Wash. App. Dec. 30 1997).
206. See Temco Metal Prods. v. GT Dev. Corp., No. 99-755-KI, 2000 WL 556607, at *3
(D.Or. May 5, 2000). According to the court:
At the preliminary injunction stage of this action, I found it appropriate to enjoin GT
from employing Fasolino in certain capacities. Because of Fasolino's extensive knowl-
edge of Temco's products, and the limited endorsement by the Washington courts of the
"inevitable disclosure" theory of trade secret misappropriation, I felt it was appropriate to
constrain Fasolino's employment at GT for a period of time sufficient to allow Temco to
obtain patent protection for its products.
Id.
207. See Solutec, 1997 WL 794496, at *1-*2 (the Solutec Corp. v. Agnew decision is listed and
explained as one of the cases granting injunctive relief after the PepsiCo decision). See also William
Lynch Schaller, Trade Secret Inevitable Disclosure: Substantive, Procedural & Practical Implica-
tions of an Evolving Doctrine (Part 11), 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 411, 413 (2004);
Harvey, supra note 204, at 138-39 (the Solutec decision is listed and explained as one of the cases
granting injunctive relief after the PepsiCo decision).
208. WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 2.06.040 (2006) ("All decisions of the court having preceden-
tial value shall be published as opinions of the court. Each panel shall determine whether a decision
of the court has sufficient precedential value to be published .... Decisions determined not to have
precedential value shall not be published.").
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containing morpholine for use in the apple industry. 20 9 The two defen-
dants, Mr. Agnew and Mr. Ingle, were former employees of Solutec who
attempted to compete with their former boss by manufacturing edible
apple wax as well. 210
The trial court held that Solutec's edible wax formulations were
trade secrets and enjoined the defendants from using or disclosing the
secret information and from competing with Solutec in the production of
waxes containing morpholine for six years. On appeal, the defendants
claimed that the lower court erred in its issuance of an injunction because
the defendants had not misappropriated the trade secrets by actually
using them in the production of apple waxes.212
In affirming the injunction, the appellate court relied on the Seventh
Circuit's famous inevitable disclosure opinion, PepsiCo, Inc. v. Red-
mond.2 13 The Solutec court referred to the PepsiCo decision to establish
the proposition that injunctive relief can be granted in cases of threatened
214trade secret misappropriation. In Solutec, the court analogized the
UTSA provision that was applicable in the PepsiCo case to the identical
Washington UTSA provision, noting that the language of the Act permits
injunctive relief where there is a lack of actual trade secret disclosure. 2 15
The court reasoned that there was "a high degree of probability of inevi-
table and immediate ... use of. . . [Solutec's] trade secrets ,216 given
that both defendants only had high school educations and that it was
highly unlikely that someone without a college degree in either chemistry
or chemical engineering could develop a marketable, edible apple wax.217
The court further noted that the broad scope of the injunction was appro-
priate to give Solutec the relief it deserved under the UTSA.2 18 Thus, the
Solutec decision invokes the doctrine of inevitable disclosure. However,
as an unpublished opinion, the question remains whether such "limited
endorsement" will be adopted by other Washington courts.
Other courts have relied on Washington's "limited endorsement" of
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure to restrain employees from taking
similar positions with competitors of their former employers when there
209. See 1997 WL 794496, at * 1; see also Harvey, supra note 204, at 138-39.
210. Solutec, 1997 WL 794496, at *1.
211. Id.
212. Id at *8.
213. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
214. Solutec, 1997 WL 794496, at *8.
215. Id.
216. Id. (quoting language from Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Commc'ns Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353,
356 (N.D. Ill. 1989)).
217. Id.
218. Id. at *9.
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is a risk of trade secret misappropriation. 21 9 For example, in November of
2005, the Ninth Circuit decided Lam Research Corp. v. Deshmukh.2 2 ° In
this unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that "Washington
law may embrace the inevitable disclosure doctrine," citing to Solutec.22'
The court in Lam Research Corp. reversed the injunction granted by the
district court because (1) the injunction was issued solely on the em-
ployer's theory of inevitable disclosure, as there was no allegation of
222actual trade secret misappropriation, and (2) the court erroneously
applied Washington law instead of California law.22 3 According to this
opinion, the injunction, based on a valid inevitable disclosure theory as
recognized by Washington, had to be vacated because California law
does not recognize the doctrine.2 24 The Ninth Circuit thus reversed the
district court's decision and dismissed the employer's complaint. 225
C. Washington Should Abandon the Doctrine
While neither Washington courts nor the federal courts of the Ninth
Circuit have applied the doctrine in a published opinion, employers' use
of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure to obtain injunctive relief is only
expected to rise, especially given the growing importance of intellectual
226property and the increased sophistication of technology. As firms in-
crease investments into intellectual property assets, they have the incen-
tive to protect against the disclosure of sensitive trade secrets. Therefore,
the use of inevitable disclosure to enjoin the threatened misappropriation
of trade secrets will become more common.227 Consequently, Washing-
ton courts will be presented with an opportunity to either officially adopt
or reject the doctrine as having precedential value. When faced with that
choice, Washington courts should not adopt the doctrine because of its
negative effects on employee mobility in the technology field and
because of the state's recognition that noncompetition agreements
provide sufficient trade secret protection.
219. See Temco Metal Prods. v. GT Dev. Corp., No. 99-755-K1, 2000 WL 556607, at *3 (D.
Or. May 5, 2000).
220. No. 05-35230, 2005 WL 3159685 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 2005).
221. Id. at *1.
222. Id.
223. Id. at *2.
224. Id.; but see Carey, supra note 2, at 148 (citing a California court that has adopted the
doctrine, Electro Optical Industries, Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
("Although no California court has yet adopted it, the inevitable disclosure rule is rooted in common
sense and... [w]e adopted the rule here.")).
225. Lam Research Corp., 2005 WL 3159685, at *2.
226. Harvey, supra note 204, at 144.
227. Id.
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Admittedly, there are justifications for the application of the doc-
trine. Employers have a valid interest in protecting their valuable trade
secrets from misappropriation by others. 8 Just as competitors are not
permitted to illegally take real property, they should be prevented from
stealing intellectual property from others. It would be unfair and illogical
to prohibit the theft of tangible property,229 while permitting the theft of
intangible property assets, such as trade secrets. Furthermore, trade secret
litigation is very expensive 230 and the application of the doctrine allows
courts to make judgments without requiring plaintiffs to prove actual
misappropriation. Additionally, the parties' expectations in a given em-
ployment relationship may support the argument that the doctrine does
not really infringe upon the employee's freedom of mobility. 2 1 If the
parties have entered into a noncompetition agreement, valid or not, then
it could be argued that the employee expected for his mobility to be
restricted.232 The existence of a noncompetition agreement shows that the
parties bargained for their current relationship and that the employee
should have foreseen that his freedom of employment choice would
potentially be restricted.233
Despite its advantages, Washington courts should abandon their
limited recognition of the doctrine for four main reasons. First, the
doctrine directly conflicts with the idea that employees have a right to
voluntarily leave a current job in order to pursue their livelihood.234
Second, application of the doctrine raises difficult questions about what
knowledge an employee actually possesses as his versus that which an
employer owns as a trade secret.235 Distinguishing between information
that rightfully belongs to the employer and that which is general
knowledge is a difficult undertaking. It is unfair to burden employees
with the adverse effects of an unclear definition, particularly since they
are most often the party in the weaker bargaining position.
Third, the doctrine creates a noncompetition agreement where one
did not previously exist.236 When the employer asks the employee to en-
ter into a noncompetition agreement, the employer gives the employee
some type of benefit in exchange for the promise not to compete in the
future. However, an application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine
228. Rowe, supra note 23, at 183.
229. See id. at 185.
230. Bone, supra note 25, at 278.
231. See Rowe, supra note 23, at 209.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Rowe, supra note 23, at 183.
235. Id. at 184.
236. Id. at 207.
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creates employee obligations (that is, the promise not to compete) for
which the employer has not specifically bargained.237 Thus, the employee
is not compensated for this obligation and is instead prevented from
238offering his skills to the highest bidder in a competitive marketplace.
Fourth, the doctrine forces courts to make a prediction about future
events.239 By asking courts to determine whether a former employee will
improperly disclose a trade secret at some unknown future date,24° the
doctrine requires the court to evaluate ambiguous circumstantial
evidence from which inferences about the employee's behavior must be
drawn.24' This prediction is not required to be accurate, and the risk of an
inaccurate judicial prediction places all losses on the employee who has
been enjoined from working in her field of expertise.
The doctrine's aforementioned negative effects could have a serious
impact on the growth of Washington's high-technology industry. These
impacts should be considered when deciding whether to fully adopt the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure. One such negative effect is the stifling
of employee mobility.242 Application of the doctrine could prevent an
employee from working in his chosen field of expertise, 243 assuming he
is permitted to work at all. The benefits that a technology-based indus-
trial community receive from having a high rate of employee mobility
are suppressed by the threat that the doctrine will be applied.244 Thus, the
knowledge spillover that has been linked to Silicon Valley's high-tech
industry success can be effectively quashed by the inevitable disclosure
doctrine. Furthermore, application of the doctrine could potentially have
a disparate impact on the growth of the technology industry245 because
the investment in emerging companies, new technologies, and people
will be reduced. 46
Additionally, application of the doctrine is anticompetitive, espe-
cially with regard to the high-tech industry.247 Inevitable disclosure
reduces the incentives for competitor-firms to search for qualified em-
ployees within the ranks of their competitors,248 and employees may
237. Carey, supra note 2, at 151.
238. See id at 150.
239. See Rowe, supra note 23, at 215.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Brenner, supra note 10, at 669.
243. Id.
244. See Carey, supra note 2, at 151.
245. Brenner, supra note 10, at 672.
246. Id
247. Carey, supra note 2, at 151.
248. Brenner, supra note 10, at 666.
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choose not to engage in their own competitive start-up companies. 249 If a
former employee leaves her current position in order to start her own
high-tech firm, an injunction issued under the doctrine could have the
effect of killing competition simply because the pace of technology
250makes an innovation valuable for a limited duration.
Accordingly, Washington should not fully adopt the doctrine of in-
evitable disclosure. The problems associated with the application of the
doctrine outweigh the perceived benefits that recognition would give to
the proprietors of trade secrets. This is especially true in Washington,
where reasonable noncompetition agreements are recognized as valid
restrictions on employee mobility. The inability to precisely define in-
formation as having trade secret status forces courts to make future pre-
dictions that unfairly penalize employees, which is manifestly at odds
with the basic notions of the right to employment. Further, the doctrine's
creation, in effect, of a noncompetition agreement where one had not
previously existed is unfair to employees and again penalizes them for
having marketable skills. The benefits that can be reaped from industrial
growth in the high-tech field will potentially be greater if the doctrine is
abandoned because employee mobility will be less restrained and
competition will not be hampered. Lastly, the justifications supporting
the doctrine's application do not apply with strong force in Washington
simply because this state already recognizes and actively enforces valid
noncompetition agreements. If an employer wants to seek additional
protection for his trade secrets, Washington already permits this choice.
V. CONCLUSION
The competing values of adequate intellectual property protection
and employee mobility are both valid, important considerations in any
state's legal structure. Specifically, in states where a large part of the
economy is driven by high-tech commercial activity, the balancing of
values becomes that much more important. Washington's strict protec-
tion of intellectual property rights allows for significant commercial
gains and innovation in its high-tech community. However, the state's
recognition of both noncompetition agreements and the inevitable disclo-
sure doctrine threatens employee mobility and the positive knowledge
spillover that mobility creates. A better balance of the competing inter-
ests of employer rights in intellectual property and of the employee's
interest in mobility would help to ensure that high-tech innovation and
commercial activity continue to grow in Washington. This balance can
249. Id. at 668.
250. Carey, supra note 2, at 151.
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be achieved by rejecting the inevitable disclosure doctrine and instead
relying solely on reasonable noncompetition agreements to govern the
expectations of the high-tech employer and employee. Washington's
long-standing recognition of noncompetition agreements is a legal
tradition that sufficiently protects an employer's legitimate trade secrets.
As such, there is no need for the redundant and overly-restrictive
inevitable disclosure doctrine in Washington State.
